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Sukesh: Contextualizing the T-Mobile Mega-Merger

NOTE
INVESTIGATING A MEGA-MERGER:
CONTEXTUALIZING THE T-MOBILE MERGER TO
THE CONSUMER WELFARE STANDARD AND THE
COMPETITION STANDARD
Rahul Sukesh*
This Note explores the ruling of the U.S. Judge Victor Marrero in favor of
the merger between T-Mobile and Sprint in terms of the specifics of the
merger itself, and more broadly, the two dominant schools of antitrust
thought: the consumer welfare standard and the competition standard and
the specifics of the merger itself. Highlighting issues of antitrust law, this
Note will first outline certain background concepts necessary to understand
legal precedence around antitrust law. This Note will then trace the merger
overtime and focus on how various opposition forces, citing violations of
antitrust law, amassed a large body of supporters and later settled their
claims. Specifically, the Note will outline why there was opposition to the
merger and what was done to alleviate it. Fourthly, this Note will elaborate
on the facts used by Judge Marrero that helped him approve the merger. The
Note will then explore a hypothetical of what would have happened, had the
merger failed, to better contextualize the argument around the merger and
understand the merits of its approval. The Note will lastly focus on how this
case plays into the larger context of two dominating schools of antitrust
policy. Defining both schools, this Note will conclude that it stands apart as
satisfying metrics outlined and suggests it, tentatively, satisfies both schools.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 29th, 2018 John Legere, CEO of T-Mobile, posted a video on
twitter with Marcelo Claure, former CEO of Sprint, announcing the two
companies had come to an agreement and were going to merge. Highlighting
the fact they would become America’s first “nationwide 5G network,” the
two, then, CEOs implied the jump to a 5G network would be even bigger and
better than when “America’s early 4G leadership added millions of jobs in
this country [United States] and billions that created jobs and added billions
in US GDP.”221 Although the “New T-Mobile,” as they coined it, was looking
seemingly positive, the merger caught the attention of State Attorney
Generals after the two companies filed for a protective order to “limit access
to proprietary or confidential information” on June 15th, 2018.222 Almost four
months later, on September 4th, 2018, a public notice was released explaining
that pursuant to the protective order, the New York State Attorney General
had requested information and intended “on sharing those materials with
other state attorneys general,” acknowledging the State Attorney General of
California.223 A year later, by September of 2019, the lawsuit against TMobile’s majority shareholder Deutsche Telekom AG. and Sprint’s parent
company Softbank Group Corp was supported by 18 states, citing the merger
would violate antitrust laws and raise prices for consumers.224
However, less than a year after amassing a coalition, in February of 2020,
the T-Mobile merger was approved.225 But the questions of why it was
221

Legere, John. “I'm Excited to Announce That @TMobile & @Sprint have Reached an
Agreement to Come Together to Form a New Company – a Larger, Stronger Competitor
That Will Be a Force for Positive Change for All US Consumers and Businesses! Watch
This & Click through for Details.” Twitter, Twitter, 29 Apr. 2018,
twitter.com/JohnLegere/status/990622865522348035?s=20.
222
See Applications of T-Mobile US, Inc. and Sprint Corporation: Consolidated
Applications for Consent to Transfer Control of Licenses and Authorizations, DA 18-624
(June 15, 2018), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-18-624A1.pdf.
223
See Notice of Request by Offices of State Attorneys General To Review Submissions in
Docket NO. 18-197 that contain NRUF and LNP Data, DA 18-908 (September 4, 2018),
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-18-908A1.pdf.
224
See Deutsche Telekom AG, T-Mobile US, INC., Sprint Corporation v. State of New
York (11 June, 2019),
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/6.11.19_new_york_attorney_general_james_moves_to_
block_t-mobile_and_sprint_megamerger.pdf.
225
Laurel Wamsley, Judge Rules In Favor Of T-Mobile Takeover Of Sprint, NPR, (Jan 11,
2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/02/11/804848534/judge-rules-in-favor-of-t-mobiletakeover-of-sprint.
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objected and how the merger passed remains. Looking closer at antitrust
laws, what does this merger mean not only for the future of wireless industries
in the U.S. but for consumers who will be affected by it? More significantly
however, is the question of ethics that should be addressed. Chiefly, is the
creation of such a goliath ethical? Who does it benefit and who does it harm?
II. OUTLING ANTITRUST LAW
As the basis for the lawsuit and pending concern against the merger
between T-Mobile and Sprint cited issues of antitrust law, having a general
understanding of antitrust law will shed light on the breath of the issue. In
practice today, there are three core antitrust laws: the Sherman Act of 1890,
and the more recent Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) and Clayton Act
both of 1914.226 The Sherman Act and Clayton Act are more significant to
the implications of this case. In detail, the Sherman Act outlaws any attempt
to restrict or monopolize trade within reasonable measure. Seemingly vague,
this act applies to action that would hinder competition. Added to supplement
the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act “addresses specific practices… such as
mergers… the Sherman Act does not clearly prohibit” that would still hinder
competition.”227
With the merger of T-Mobile and Sprint as initially planned, T-Mobile
and Sprint would merge with the promise of creating jobs, lowering prices,
and providing good service to consumers. However, as is, the consummation
would violate the Clayton Act. Outlined in Section 7, the Clayton Act
elaborates on “prohibiting mergers and acquisitions where the effect ‘may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.’”228
While the mega merger doesn’t threaten to create a monopoly, through
consolidating two of four major companies it most certainly lessens the
competition. Although the merger underwent one significant concession
making DISH Network Corp., through the process various states picked sides
for and against the union of T-Mobile and Sprint.229

226
See “The Antitrust Laws.” Federal Trade Commission, 15 Dec. 2017, www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws.
227
Id.
228
Id.
229
See Press Release, The United States Department of Justice, Justice Department Settles
with T-Mobile and Sprint in Their Proposed Merger by Requiring a Package of
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Following the legal skirmish between various states and T-Mobile sheds
light on how the merger changed to become above board and why states
became content. The last bit of legal history pertaining to this note is the
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, more commonly referred to as the
Tunney Act. Central to any settlement between the United States (including
the states and Department of Justice) and any private organization, the
Tunney act is more of a formality for the court to “determine that the entry of
such judgement [between the two parties] is in the public interest.”230
Keeping the people protected, the court evaluates, and later approves any
settlement for antitrust cases.
III. THE OPPOSITION AND SUPPORT
From even before the initial lawsuit up until today, despite the recent
verdict, the merger between T-Mobile and Spring has been continually
challenged and taken up in arms by various State Attorneys Generals. Among
the first to support the merger were New Mexico and Utah. Announcing their
approval in a joint letter dated July 10, 2018, much earlier than everyone else,
Attorney General's Hector Balderas and Sean Reyes, from New Mexico and
Utah respectively, didn’t give much attention to whether the merger would
violate antitrust.231 The bulk of the letter addressed the benefits the merger
would bring to these states citing “nationwide 5G… will greatly improve the
lives of underserved Americans in rural areas, stimulate economic growth
through investment and job creation, and increase competition in the
converging internet market for mobile internet.”232 Following an
investigation conducted by the State Attorney General of New York after
initially hearing about the merger in September of 2018, the chaos unleashed
and over the next year and a half leading to the trial.233 States began picking
Divestitures to Dish, (July 26, 2019), www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-settles-tmobile-and-sprint-their-proposed-merger-requiring-package.
230
See Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16, § 782 (1974).
231
See Letter from Attorney General of Utah and Attorney General of New México to
members of the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition July 10, 2018,
https://attorneygeneral.utah.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Joint-AG-Letter-toCommittee-7.10.18.pdf.
232
Id.
233
See Notice of Request by Offices of State Attorneys General To Review Submissions in
Docket NO. 18-197 that contain NRUF and LNP Data, DA 18-908 (September 4, 2018),
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-18-908A1.pdf.
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sides either for or against the merger. The initial lawsuit against the merger
coming from the collective action of the states led by New York and
California included Colorado, Connecticut, Maryland, Michigan,
Mississippi, Wisconsin, Virginia, and the District of Columbia and stood as
a seemingly strong opposition force to the merger on June 11th, 2019.234
Understanding the four major mobile network operations, Verizon, AT&T,
T-Mobile, and Sprint, (MNOs) served “at least 90% of the U.S. population,”
the most pressing complaint was that the alleged merger would reduce
competition from the four major competitors to three.235 While T-Mobile’s
controlling shareholder Deutsche Telekom AG wanted to “earn a greater
return on its investment” by merging two of the four MNOs, numerous State
Attorneys General cited such a move would “lead to less competition.”236
Already breaking the Clayton Act, the suit noted the merger would,
contingent on the merger raising consumer bills, “be particularly harmful to
prepaid subscribers” who they defined as typically low-income subscribers
who would not be able to pass a credit check making the prepaid service the
only mobile wireless telecommunication service they can get.237 The trial was
set for December 9th, 2019.
A little over a month later, on July 26th, 2019, five states, Kansas,
Nebraska, Oklahoma, Ohio, and South Dakota followed in the footsteps of
New York and California and filed a complaint brought a civil antitrust suit
to DC.238 Although the actual complaint noted the same issues brought up in
the case led by New York and California, the overall proceedings were
drastically different. Mainly, instead of establishing a court date for the trial,
just four days after, on July 30th, 2019, the five states alongside the
Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a Competitive Impact Statement detailing
that the five states had reached a settlement and dropped their suit.239
234

See Deutsche Telekom AG, T-Mobile US, INC., Sprint Corporation v. State of New
York (11 June, 2019),
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/6.11.19_new_york_attorney_general_james_moves_to_
block_t-mobile_and_sprint_megamerger.pdf.
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
See State of Kansas v. Deutsche Telekom AG, Press Release United States District
Court for the District of Columbia (July 26, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pressrelease/file/1187721/download.
239
See United States of America, et al. v. Deutsche Telekom AG, (July 30, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1189336/download.
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Addressing the reduction in major telecommunication players from four to
three, the settlement called for the new T-Mobile to “divest Sprint’s prepaid
business, including Boost Mobile, Virgin Mobile, and Sprint prepaid, to
DISH Network Corp.”240 In addition to other concessions, this would, in
theory, give DISH support and more stake in the telecommunications
industry. With no objections during the court’s review under the Tunney Act,
the settlement was deemed worthy in the interest of T-Mobile, and more
importantly, the public. The basic idea was to “provide DISH with the assets
and transitional services required to become a facilities-based mobile
network operator that can provide a full range of mobile wireless services
nationwide.”241 In other words, the settlement introduced DISH as a fourth
competitor restoring balance to the issue the merger would create. As
precedent with any case filed by the DOJ, the proposed settlement
With numerous states sticking with their lawsuit and numerous states
settling or coming out in favor, other states started getting involved. On
September 18th, Pennsylvania’s Attorney General Josh Shapiro became the
18th, and last, to join the lawsuit against the merger.242 In response to the
settlement between five states, the DOJ, and T-Mobile and Sprint,
Connecticut AG William Tong, speaking on behalf of the then 13 state (and
the District of Columbia) lawsuit, commented that the concessions made to
grow DISH would still be insufficient to create a fourth competitor, because
to them, “DISH [was] simply not a viable or serious alternative for
consumers, and this contrived agreement [did] nothing to ensure healthy
competition.”243
The following table details a timeline of when states joined the lawsuit,
when states dropped the lawsuit or joined the settlement, and when other key
240
See Press Release, The United States Department of Justice, Justice Department Settles
with T-Mobile and Sprint in Their Proposed Merger by Requiring a Package of
Divestitures to Dish.”, 26 July 2019, www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-settles-tmobile-and-sprint-their-proposed-merger-requiring-package.
241
Id.
242
See Press Release, NYS Attorney General, AG James: Pennsylvania Addition To TMobile/sprint Lawsuit Keeps States' Momentum Moving Forward, (September 18th 2019),
https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2019/ag-james-pennsylvania-addition-t-mobilesprintlawsuit-keeps-states-momentum.
243
See Press Release, Office of the Attorney General Connecticut, AG Tong: T-Mobile/
Sprint Megamerger Remains A Bad Deal for Consumers, Innovation and Workers (July 26,
2019), https://portal.ct.gov/AG/Press-Releases/2019-Press-Releases/AG-TONGTMOBILE-SPRINT-MEGAMERGER-REMAINS-A-BAD-DEAL-FOR-CONSUMERSINNOVATION-AND-WORKERS.
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actors like the FCC and DOJ came out in support for the merger:
Apart of the Multi-State Lawsuit
When

Who

June 11
2019

New York,
California, Colorado,
Connecticut, District
of Columbia,
Maryland, Michigan,
Mississippi, Virginia,
& Wisconsin initiate
lawsuit246

June 21

Hawaii,
Massachusetts,
Minnesota, & Nevada
join lawsuit247

Publicly Supports the Merger OR
Settled
When

Who

July 2018

Utah & New Mexico
show support244

May 20
2019

FCC shows initial
support245

244

See Letter from Attorney General of Utah and Attorney General of New México to
members of the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition July 10, 2018,
https://attorneygeneral.utah.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Joint-AG-Letter-toCommittee-7.10.18.pdf.
245
See Press Release, FCC, Chairman Pai Statement on T-Mobile/ Sprint Transaction,
(May 20, 2019), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-357535A1.pdf.
246
See Deutsche Telekom AG, T-Mobile US, INC., Sprint Corporation v. State of New
York (11 June, 2019),
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/6.11.19_new_york_attorney_general_james_moves_to_
block_t-mobile_and_sprint_megamerger.pdf.
247
See Stempel, Reuters, Four More U.S. states join lawsuit to stop T-Mobile-Sprint deal
(June 21, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sprint-corp-t-mobile-us/four-statesjoin-lawsuit-to-stop-t-mobile-sprint-deal-idUSKCN1TM1ZA.
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July 26

Kansas, Nebraska,
Oklahoma, Ohio, and
South Dakota settle
with the Department
of Justice248 and
Arizona shows
support249

August 14

Formal FCC
Support251

August 16

Louisiana joins
settlement253

Texas joins lawsuit250

August 16

Oregon joins
lawsuit252

September 3

Illinois joins
lawsuit254

248
See United States of America, et al. v. Deutsche Telekom AG, (July 30, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1189336/download.
249
See Press Release, Attorney General State of Arizona, Attorney General Brnovich
Statement on DOJ-T-Mobile/Sprint Merger Settlement, (July 26, 2019)
https://www.azag.gov/press-release/attorney-general-brnovich-statement-doj-tmobilesprint-merger-settlement.
250
See Press Release, NYS Attorney General, Attorney General James Announces Texas
Joins Lawsuit To Block T-Mobile and Sprint Megamerger, (August 1, 2019)
https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2019/attorney-general-james-announces-texas-joins-lawsuitblock-t-mobile-and-sprint.
251
See Press Release, FCC, Chairman Pai Formally Recommends Approval of T-Mobile/
Sprint Merger (August 14, 2019) https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC359080A1.docx.
252
See Press Release, NYS Attorney General, General James Announces Oregon Joins
Lawsuit to Block T-Mobile and Sprint Megamerger https://ag.ny.gov/pressrelease/2019/attorney-general-james-announces-oregon-joins-lawsuit-block-t-mobile-andsprint.
253
See Alex Wagner, Louisiana comes out in support of T-Mobile and Sprint’s Merger,
(August 16, 2018), https://www.tmonews.com/2019/08/louisiana-t-mobile-sprint-mergersupport/.
254
See Press Release, Illinois Attorney General, Attorney General Raoul Announces
Lawsuit Blocking T-Mobile/ Sprint Megamerger (September 3, 2019),
https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2019_09/20190903.html.
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Pennsylvania joins
lawsuit255
September
27

Florida joins
settlement256

October 9

Mississippi joins
settlement257

Oct 28

Colorado joins
settlement258

Nov 8

Arkansas joins
settlement259

Nov 25

Nevada260 and
Texas261 join

255

See Press Release, NYS State Attorney General, AG James: Pennsylvania Addition to
T-Mobile/ Sprint Lawsuit Keeps States’ Momentum Moving Forward, (September 18,
2019) https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2019/ag-james-pennsylvania-addition-t-mobilesprintlawsuit-keeps-states-momentum.
256
See Press Release, Attorney General State of Florida, T-Mobile and Sprint Pledged
Commitments in the State of Florida, (September 27, 2019),
http://myfloridalegal.com/webfiles.nsf/WF/GPEY-BGKM5Q/$file/TMobile+agreement.pdf.
257
See David Sheaprdson, Reuters, Mississippi will back Sprint, T-Mobile merger and drop
court challenge, (October 9, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sprint-corp-m-a-tmobileus/mississippi-will-back-sprint-t-mobile-merger-and-drop-court-challengeidUSKBN1WO2Q3.
258
See Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice Department Welcomes Colorado
Joining T-Mobile/Sprint Settlement, (October 28, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-welcomes-colorado-joining-tmobilesprint-settlement.
259
See Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice Department Welcomes Arkansas
Joining T-Mobile/Sprint Settlement, (November 8, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-welcomes-arkansas-joining-tmobilesprint-settlement.
260
See Press Release, Nevada Attorney General, Attorney General Ford Negotiates
Settlement for T-Mobile-Sprint Merger Prioritizing Nevada Jobs, (November 25, 2019),
https://ag.nv.gov/News/PR/2019/Attorney_General_Ford_Negotiates_Settlement_for_TMobile-Sprint_Merger_Prioritizing_Nevada_Jobs/.
261
See Press Release, Attorney General of Texas, AG Paxton Announces Settlement
Agreement with T-Mobile on Sprint Merger, (November 25, 2019),
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settlement
March 11
2020

Pennsylvania,
Connecticut, District
of Columbia, Hawaii,
Illinois, Maryland,
Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Oregon,
Virginia, and
California join
settlement
262

Almost a year after New México and Utah came out in support of the
merger,263 Arizona came out concluding, from their own investigation, that
the merger would benefit the people of Arizona.264 Louisiana and Arkansas
joined the settlement citing the creation of jobs in rural areas would greatly

https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/ag-paxton-announces-settlementagreement-t-mobile-sprint-merger.
262
See Press Release, Maryland Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General Frosh
Announces Settlement Ending the State’s Challenge to T-Mobile/Sprint Merger, (March
11, 2020), https://www.marylandattorneygeneral.gov/press/2020/031120a.pdf. See also
Press Release, The Office of Minnesota Attorney General, AG Ellison Wins Protections for
Minnesota consumers and jobs in T-Mobile settlement, (March 11, 2020),
https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Office/Communications/2020/03/11_T-Mobile.asp. See also
Press Release, Office of Attorney General Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Attorney
General Shapiro Announces T-Mobile, Sprint Merger Settlement, (March 11, 2020),
https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/taking-action/press-releases/attorney-general-shapiroannounces-t-mobile-sprint-merger-settlement/. See also Press Release, Office of the
Attorney General California Department of Justice, Attorney General Becerra Announces
Settlement Ending the State’s Challenge to T-Mobile, Sprint Merger, (March 11, 2020),
https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-becerra-announces-settlementending-state’s-challenge-t-mobile.
263
See Letter from Attorney General of Utah and Attorney General of New México to
members of the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition July 10, 2018,
https://attorneygeneral.utah.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Joint-AG-Letter-toCommittee-7.10.18.pdf.
264
See Press Release, Attorney General State of Arizona, Attorney General Brnovich
Statement on DOJ-T-Mobile/Sprint Merger Settlement, (July 26, 2019),
https://www.azag.gov/press-release/attorney-general-brnovich-statement-doj-tmobilesprint-merger-settlement.
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benefit them.265 Nevertheless, after five states settled with the DOJ, others
joined the settlement. One big factor helping state settle was the FCC
formally supporting the merger. Citing the numerous benefits including
increased coverage for all Americans, the FCC said “the network benefits of
the transaction are particularly important for the nation’s underserved rural
areas”266 Dealing directly with the states themselves, as opposed to
addressing the multi-state suit, T-Mobile reached out to states promising state
specific benefits. In one such case, Nevada was offered 5G coverage for 64%
of the state within three years of closing, a “low-price mobile commitment,”
jobs for the locals, and “free connectivity and equipment to households with
school-age children.”267 Although the promises themselves were essentially
the same for each state, each state became more inclined to join the settlement
knowing they themselves would be taken care of.
The polarity between the two sides was over the same two points:
violation of antitrust laws, and consequently the realistic probability that
DISH would become a competitive fourth MNO, and the creation of jobs.
Those who sided with the settlement valued the creation of jobs over any
potential violation of the Clayton Act and were more optimistic in the
promisingly strong future of DISH whereas those who sided with the lawsuit
didn’t.
IV. THE VERDICT
With a large opposition group, and an almost equally large support group,
any verdict would surely upset someone. Aside from the states’ stake in the
game, the biggest parties involved were T-Mobile and Sprint. One cited
reason the two telecommunication companies initially sought to merge was
265

See Monica Alleven, Fierce Wireless, Louisiana joins DoJ, backing T-Mobile/Sprint
deal, (August 19, 2019), https://www.fiercewireless.com/wireless/louisiana-joins-dojstates-backing-t-mobile-sprint-deal. See also, Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice
Department Welcomes Arkansas Joining T-Mobile/Sprint Settlement, (November 8, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-welcomes-arkansas-joining-tmobilesprint-settlement.
266
See Applications of T-Mobile US, INC., and SPrint Corporation For Consent to
Transfer Control of Licenses and Authorizations, FCC 19-103, (November 5, 2019),
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-19-103A1.pdf.
267
See Press Release, Nevada Attorney General, Attorney General Ford Negotiates
Settlement for T-Mobile-Sprint Merger Prioritizing Nevada Jobs, (November 25, 2019),
https://ag.nv.gov/News/PR/2019/Attorney_General_Ford_Negotiates_Settlement_for_TMobile-Sprint_Merger_Prioritizing_Nevada_Jobs/.
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to save Sprint. Despite being the fourth largest MNO, “Sprint’s trajectory
over the past decade [had] been largely downward.”268 “Failing to earn net
income for eleven straight years,” the company needed something, like the
T-Mobile merger, to keep them in the game.269 Although this issue was
brought up in both the settlement and the suit against the merger, it wasn’t an
issue most, besides Sprint, cared about. Instead, the issue revolved around
whether or not the U.S. District Judge Victor Marrero would allow the
consumption of two tech goliaths -- as we know, on February 11th, 2020, he
did.
In a three-part argument, Judge Marrero rejected the suit to block the
merger. First, speaking to the antitrust concerns, the decision stated, “the
Court concludes that the proposed merger is not reasonably likely to
substantially lessen competition.”270 Second, addressing the future of Sprint,
“while Sprint has made… attempts to stay competitive” the decision said,
“Sprint is falling short… to remain relevant as a significant competitor.”271
Lastly, introducing DISH as the new fourth NMO, Judge Marrero wrote that,
“DISH’s statements at trial persuade the Court that the new firm will take
advantage of its opportunity.”272
Knowing the merger would be difficult, if not impossible to appeal, five
days later New York’s Attorney General addressed the press saying New
York would not pursue an appeal and would instead “work with all the parties
to ensure that consumers get the best pricing and service possible.”273
Around a month later, on March 11th, 2020, California and all those
remaining in the suit settled with T-Mobile and Sprint.274 In addition to the
benefits the states who previously settled had, the merged company would
reimburse up to $15 million in litigation fees to all the states, guarantee the
creation of jobs and provide free Wi-Fi for low-income households in
268

See State of New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG, (February 11, 2020),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6773582/TMO.pdf.
269
Id.
270
Id.
271
Id.
272
Id.
273
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See Press Release, Maryland Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General Frosh
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California.275
What’s concerning is the entire case is about the future, so no matter how
many facts or cases either side can cite as opposition, no one will be able to
tell how this story unfolds and whether or not antitrust laws will be violated.
V. ENDORSING THE HYPOTHETICAL
In the introduction of the case it was noted that the “adjudication of
antitrust disputes virtually turns the judge into a fortuneteller” and that
remark seems logical.276 The entire basis of the case is on what can happen
in the future. It is, at the best, speculative of the current market, historical
precedent, and past business mergers and acquisitions. While the verdict
Judge Marrero would inevitably upset some people, through reading the facts
of the case and conducting research, there is one other factor I wanted to
consider that most others ignored: what would the antitrust concerns be if the
merger was blocked and Sprint inevitably ran itself into the ground? The
number of NMO competitors naturally reduces to three. What then would the
various State Attorneys Generals do about their antitrust concerns? Granted
a hypothetical case, I only suggest this issue because the entire case itself was
a huge “what if.” Before indulging in this, it’s worth noting the suit briefly
mentioned this. Chiefly, one of the plaintiff's arguments against the suit was
that Sprint “made several attempts to improve its network perception and
demonstrate that it could be a disruptive competitor” but even after Claure
joined the team in 2014, his plans to reinvigorate Sprint and increase network
coverage “failed miserably.”277 The question of Sprint coming back into the
game as a realistic competitor was, at this point, out of question. Therefore,
what would have happened had Sprint run its course and eventually
dissolved? In short, nothing. The number of NMOs would have gone down
275

See Press Release, Office of the Attorney General California Department of Justice,
Attorney General Becerra Announces Settlement Ending the State’s Challenge to TMobile, Sprint Merger, (March 11, 2020), https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorneygeneral-becerra-announces-settlement-ending-state’s-challenge-t-mobile. See Settlement
Agreement and Release of Claims, (March 9, 2020),
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276
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to three leaving the same antitrust concerns brought up in the suit. The only
difference between the three companies in this case and the real world is that
now T-Mobile, instead of being third to AT&T and Verizon, can very easily
have a hand up on both if they deliver on their promise for nationwide 5G
network.
Incorporating the inclusion of DISH Network as a fourth possible NMO,
the merger passing seems best for everyone. Albeit the question of DISH’s
reliability is a huge question but had the merger been blocked, DISH would
not have the resources the settlement with the DOJ mandated, and DISH
would have little to no chance to enter this competitive arena. Essentially
another way of coming to the same verdict as Judge Marrero, the merger
seemingly worked out for the “new” T-Mobile and those in fear of antitrust
violations.
VI. SCHOOLS OF ANTITRUST THOUGHT
In the case of antitrust policy, there has been considerable debate as to
whether or not the status quo of the consumer welfare standard has been
adequate in determining whether or not certain trusts were deemed
dangerous, and therefore undemocratic. Specifically, there have been two
main schools of thought: those supporting, and therefore embodying the
consumer welfare standard, and those who don’t think it’s sufficient,
following the newly coined competition standard. Understanding these
schools of thought, especially in terms of the T-Mobile merger will help
understand the concerns all those State Attorney Generals had, and if they
were right to drop their concern.
The consumer welfare standard has been “the bedrock of American
antitrust law” for a long time.278 What’s interesting about this standard is that
it doesn’t necessarily look out for what’s best for the consumer, it just ensures
the consumer won’t be harmed. Going further, the consumer welfare standard
evaluates trusts based on their economic impact first, and uses that as a metric
to see how the consumer will be affected. Notable for being the “most famous
defense” of the consumer welfare standard is Robert Bork’s 1978 book The
278

See Joe Kennedy, House of Representatives, Why the Consumer Welfare Standard
Should Remain the Bedrock of Antitrust Policy, (October, 2018),
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Antitrust Paradox.279 Aside from the importance of the consumer, Bork’s
book “instead [stressed] the importance of maximizing overall public welfare
and economic efficiency in general” and went so far to extend the term to a
‘total welfare standard.’280 Looking at the bigger picture, while mergers
might harm the consumer in the short run, the welfare standard would
consider their overall economic value and could possibly allow them to
merge. For the consumer, this would be “in the form of higher tax revenues
and wages.”281 Using similar terminology, when the verdict came out Free
State Federation President Randolph May made a statement about how the
new merger was “likely to increase competition and overall consumer
welfare.”282 Contrary to the name, the consumer welfare standard, on paper,
essentially prioritizes big corporations while also ensuring the consumers
aren’t hurt on the side. But it is important to recognize that although
proponents of the welfare standard might first look at the economic value of
any merger, it doesn’t mean that it is inadequate in protecting the people.
But with an intense focus on economics, others have questioned whether
the competition standard can best serve the American people. Looking to
encompass a wider variety of issues and target a different problem, the
competition standard comes into play. It should be noted the term
“competition standard” is not the only name for this school of thought. More
widely known as neo-Brandeisians, adapting the thought of Louis Brandeis
from the early 20th century,283 the people in this school target the issue of
“bigness,” ensuring a focus on maintaining competition; hence the name
“competition standard.” By targeting competition, this school suggests the
government can promote “a variety of aims, including… open markets, the
279
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protection of producers and consumers from monopoly abuse, and the
dispersion of political and economic control.”284 Among many prominent
neo-Brandeisians, Timothy Wu, a professor at Columbia University school
of Law, rejects the consumer welfare standard for what it has biome as
principally “measuring the harms of price collusion.”285 Wu argues the
competition standard is “more realistic and suited to the legal system,” he
further contends that the welfare standard has taken a step away from the core
issue and, in many ways, become negligent to antitrust.286 Comparing the
“wealth,” “health,” and “competitiveness” of the economy to other abstract,
and consequently controversial terms when it comes to applying them in legal
settings, Wu suggests the consumer welfare is “unmeasurable” suggesting the
way we should prevent it is by protecting the competitive process287
Understanding both popular schools, it is interesting to see how the TMobile merger plays into both; especially since it was allowed under the
consumer welfare standard. And in accordance with the DOJ settlement and
FCC report mandated by the Tunney Act, there doesn’t seem to be any issue
with the Welfare Standard.288 But what about the competition standard?
Would the T-Mobile merger satisfy neo-Brandeisians? Understanding their
principal concerns as more than economic welfare, I found it interesting how
the numerous concessions T-Mobile made satisfied some of the issues the
competition standard brings up. Specifically, in propelling DISH as a fourth
competitor, the merger didn’t change the number of key players in the
telecommunications industry. Although that might be true at face value, when
considering the bulk of settlement, in regard to DISH being Sprint’s prepaid
business, one could argue that while DISH might be in telecommunications,
they aren’t in the same sort of industry as T-Mobile, Verizon, and AT&T.
Not to say DISH can’t become a powerful fourth MNO, just that, by
analyzing the settlement, DISH isn’t one just yet.
284
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In addition to actually targeting competition, the competition standard also
highlights the actual consumer. And looking at the promises T-Mobile made
to various states, as they settled alongside the DOJ, it seems fair to assume
the American population is being taken care of. Not just in terms of jobs, but
in terms of coverage. By providing free connectivity for school-aged
children,289 and expanding connections to more rural areas and ensuring more
Americans get connections the public seem to be in good shape.290 In
addition, T-Mobile’s promise of low prices, for the first few years at least,
suggest another area the competition standard wrongfully believed the
consumer welfare standard could adequately address.
VII. CONCLUSION
Whether or not neo-Brandiesians believe the T-Mobile merger satisfied
holes allegedly left by the consumer welfare standard, this merger is
interesting to analyze because it is a recent case that sheds light on what the
consumer welfare standard can accomplish. In terms of creating artificial
competition, noting the difference between the stipulations this merger
created and the lack of a fourth MNO, had the merger failed, regardless of its
tentative strength, this case alludes to satisfying both parties, and both schools
of thought, involved throughout this two-year process. What is especially
interesting is that although the consumer welfare standard was chief antitrust
policy throughout the last two years, the issues cited by numerous state
Attorney Generals were about both the competition standard than the welfare
standard. Additionally, knowing that so many states joined the settlement in
exchange for state-specific benefits we can further suggest the influence of
the competition standard. While the future of the merger will better dictate
how successful the decision was, the prevalence in citing both schools cannot
be overlooked.
***
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